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Although the idea of a school shooting strikes fear in the hearts of school 
administrators, school employees, and parents, there is no agreement on whether arming 
employees is a sound strategy to counter this threat. There is a wide gap in viewpoints 
between gun control advocates who want tighter gun control and constitutionalists who 
believe as strongly in the Second Amendment right to bear arms. Whether or not to 
implement a weapons policy is an issue every school superintendent or school authority 
may need to face sooner or later. This research does not seek to answer the question of 
whether school districts should arm their employees. Rather, it seeks to provide a 
framework for each educational agency to explore, contemplate, and determine its course 
of action based upon risk-management principles that take into account the values, goals, 
and capabilities of the community in which the policy would apply. Possible outcomes 
include the policy options of MoreGuns (allow teachers to be armed), BanGuns (no one 
is armed), or SomeGuns (trained security or law enforcement can be armed but not 
teachers). This research is intended to stand as a resource for stakeholders such as 
legislators, parents, and employees; to equip them to engage in the policy debate; and to 
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Although the idea of a school shooting strikes fear in the hearts of school 
administrators, school employees, and parents, there is no agreement on whether arming 
employees is a sound strategy to counter this threat. There is a wide gap in viewpoints 
between gun control advocates who want tighter gun control and constitutionalists who 
believe as strongly in the Second Amendment right to bear arms. Since 2007, more than 
20 states have seen bills introduced into their legislature that propose the authorization or 
arming of school employees.1 School weapons policy is an issue involving nearly every 
law enforcement agency (at state and federal levels), the first responder community, the 
public, and school administrators. The protection of children from active shooter/armed 
intruder incidents while in school has homeland security implications that require 
objective decision making. 
The outcome of this research did not result in advocating for a particular policy 
option, but instead advocates for a policy process. One assumption of the research 
question is that there is no one correct nor universally applicable outcome; rather, there 
are possible options for every school district applicable to the unique environment, 
context, values, current capabilities and competencies (or those that could exist), and risk 
tolerance. The measure of effectiveness for each criterion considered is whether the risk 
associated with each criterion has been managed (or can be) in an acceptable manner. 
This research makes the assumption that given the current legal and social environment, 
there is no “one size fits all” answer; the same decision-making framework and process 
can be used regardless of whether the outcome supports MoreGuns (allow teachers to be 
armed), BanGuns (no one is armed), or SomeGuns (trained security or law enforcement 
can be armed but not teachers).  
California was chosen for this research because unlike other states, it lacks a 
legislative framework outlining parameters for arming school employees. In addition, 
California is recognized as a state with more restrictive gun laws, thereby making the 
                                                 
1 David B. Kopel, “Pretend Gun-Free School Zones: A Deadly Legal Fiction,” Connecticut Law 
Review 42, no. 2 (2009): 515.   
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policy decision more difficult to navigate. Although California is the intended audience, 
there are broad implications for school districts nationwide. A collateral and intended 
impact will be a contribution to the education of all stakeholders and those interested in 
the dynamics and implications of school gun policy.  
The following policy options discussed in this research represent the various 
paradigms that exist or can exist to create policy. Acknowledging the assertion of Donella 
Meadows that no paradigm is “true,” none of these policy options is truer than the next, 
but instead all are true.2 In addition, it is the mission of the superintendent in partnership 
with the applicable stakeholders to determine which option is most true for them. 
 1. BanGuns 
A BanGuns ideology primarily comes as a result of any of the following:  
• An unwillingness to incur any liability or any level of risk associated with 
firearms (risk avoidance). 
• A culture that fundamentally does not support the presence of firearms on 
campus (risk avoidance). 
• A determination that adequate insurance cannot be obtained or is cost 
prohibitive (the inability to transfer risk). 
• A lack of capacity/capability to administer a weapons policy (inability to 
mitigate risk). 
 2. MoreGuns 
A MoreGuns ideology results when culture and capacity support firearms on 
campus. To date, this ideology has been most prevalent in states with liberal gun laws, 
which does not include California. In these instances the following characteristics apply: 
• Parent and employee groups support guns on campus and no opposition is 
expressed toward arming staff or security personnel. 
• The use of a firearm is a desired part of the job to provide enhanced 
security on campus (acceptance of risk). 
• Attitudes are accepting of voluntary carry by personnel who have a license 
to carry a concealed weapon. 
                                                 
2 Donella Meadows, Thinking in Systems: A Primer, ed. Diana Wright (White River Junction, 
VT: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2008).  
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• The district is willing to incur liability, has adequate insurance in place, 
and uses indemnification agreements where appropriate, thereby achieving 
adequate risk transfer. 
• Training for persons authorized to carry a firearm is robust and consistent 
with Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) or other as prescribed 
by policy or regulation (risk mitigation). 
3. SomeGuns 
This ideology is a middle ground where neither gun advocates nor gun opponents 
achieve their fundamental goal. This approach is characterized primarily by the 
following: 
• The culture may be opposed to arming civilian employees but does not 
oppose armed security or law enforcement personnel. 
• There is a willingness to incur some liability but in a limited fashion (risk 
acceptance). 
• Adequate insurance is in place and contractual liability pertaining to the 
use of outside agencies or firms has been addressed (risk transfer). 
• Training for persons authorized to carry a firearm is robust and consistent 
with Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) or other as prescribed 
by policy or regulation (risk mitigation). 
A successful policy approach considers the whole system of interconnected pieces 
and understands how one decision or action affects other parts. Using risk management 
principles as the backdrop and foundation for making policy provides the best 
opportunity for success moving forward by prompting policymakers to objectively assess 
culture, capability, and resources in creating sound policy.  
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I have yet to see any problem, however complicated, which, when looked 
at in the right way, did not become still more complicated.  
— Poul Anderson 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT—BACKGROUND 
On October 1, 1997, Luke Woodham grabbed a lever action deer rifle, donned a 
trench coat, and headed to Pearl High School in Pearl, Mississippi, where he shot and 
killed two students and wounded seven others.3 Vice Principal Joel Myrick apprehended 
Woodham as he tried to escape, allegedly on his way to another school to continue his 
rampage. Hearing the shots, Myrick ran to his truck to retrieve his Colt .45 and bullets 
from a secured case.4 Intercepting Woodham at his vehicle, Myrick held the Colt to the 
shooter’s head and said, “Why are you shooting my kids?”5 Woodham is one of the 
earliest school shooters of the modern day, and Myrick is one of the first armed school 
employees to stop an attack.6 Although Myrick’s actions were largely applauded as 
saving lives, he was not regarded universally as a hero; he soon felt betrayed and 
isolated.7 Some of Myrick’s colleagues simply could not accept that he had held a gun to 
a student’s head.8 This case provides an example of how the decision to arm school 
employees can be confounding and complex. The debate has been ongoing at the national 
level since the late 1990s, yet shows no sign of resolution or conclusion. Whether or not 
to implement a weapons policy is an issue every school superintendent or school 
authority may need to face sooner or later. With this in mind, how is a school 
                                                 




6 Laugesen, “A Principal and His Gun;” Eugene Volokh, “Do Citizens (not Police Officers) With Guns 
Ever Stop Mass Shootings?” Washington Post, October 3, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/10/03/do-civilians-with-guns-ever-stop-mass-shootings/; Mark Follman 
et al., “US Mass Shootings, 1982–2015: Data from Mother Jones’ Investigation,” MotherJones, December 
28, 2012, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/12/mass-shootings-mother-jones-full-data.  
7 Laugesen, “A Principal and His Gun.” 
8 Ibid. 
2 
superintendent to decide? There are a number of variables that must be considered in 
coming to a policy decision.   
Peter Langman, Ph.D., maintains a comprehensive database of school shootings 
dating back to 1940, when Verlin Spencer, a principal from South Pasadena School 
District, shot and killed five people9 to the most recent school shooting (as of this 
writing), which occurred in 2015. According to Langman, 89 school-related shootings 
have occurred through 2015 involving 95 perpetrators.10 Of the total, 14 incidents 
occurred in California, eight of which occurred in K-12 schools.11 Many school-related 
shooting incidents that receive national attention revive the discussion of whether or not 
school employees should be armed. There is wide discourse between gun control 
advocates who want tighter gun control and constitutionalists who believe as strongly in 
the Second Amendment right to bear arms. Since 2007, more than 20 states have seen 
bills introduced into their legislature that propose the authorization of arming school 
employees, and some states have seen multiple bills submitted.12 School weapons policy 
is an issue involving nearly every law enforcement agency (at state and federal levels), 
the first responder community, the public, and school administrators. The protection of 
children from active shooter/armed intruder incidents while in school has homeland 
security implications that require objective decision making. This research seeks to 
provide an objective policymaking process.  
B. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The object and purpose of this research is to explore what decision-making 
criteria are used, exist, or are evident from existing practice to determine whether to arm 
school employees at a particular school. In addition, this research seeks to establish a 
decision-making model from the criteria identified to inform and support policy choices. 
                                                 
9 Peter Langman, “School Shootings in USA,” January 10, 2016, https://schoolshooters.info/browse-
database.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid.  
12 Langman, “School Shootings in USA;” David B. Kopel, “Pretend Gun-Free School Zones: A 
Deadly Legal Fiction,” Connecticut Law Review, 42, no. 2 (2009): 523–524.  
3 
The focus and outcome of the research is to identify or develop a framework based on 
risk management principles to guide and inform an objective decision-making processes. 
This research also explores whether the same criteria can inform legislators regarding 
school gun legislation. Douglas Hubbard defines risk management as, “The 
identification, assessment, and prioritization of risk followed by coordinated and 
economical application of resources to minimize, monitor, and control the probability 
and/or impact of unfortunate events.”13 More simply put, risk management is “being 
smart about taking chances.”14 Risk management has a wide application, from physical 
security to financial and insurance applications, regulatory compliance, and government 
operations.15 
This research does not seek to answer the question universally of whether school 
districts should arm their employees, but rather it seeks to provide a framework for each 
educational agency to explore, contemplate, and determine their course of action based 
upon risk management principles that take into account the values, goals, and interests of 
the community to which the policy applies. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Can risk management principles and decision-making processes provide an 
actionable framework for deciding weapons policy in California K-12 schools? California 
was chosen for this research because unlike other states, it lacks a legislative framework 
outlining the parameters for arming school employees. Other states, such as Texas, 
already have such legislation in place. In addition, California is recognized as a state with 
more restrictive gun laws thereby making reaching the policy decision more difficult to 
navigate. 
                                                 
13 Douglas W. Hubbard, The Failure of Risk Management: Why It’s Broken and How to Fix It 
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2009), 10.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid., 11. 
4 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The initial audience for this research is California school administrators. In the 
2014/2015 school year, California had just over 1,000 K-12 school districts with student 
attendance of 6,235,520.16 The size and demographic of these school districts are broadly 
different. For instance, Blake Elementary School District in Kern County is a rural school 
with five students, while Los Angeles Unified School District had an enrollment of 
646,683 students.17 This research suggests the same decision making process can be used 
for all California K-12 school districts and it is, in part, their differences that help drive 
the policy outcome. Although California is the intended audience, there are broad 
implications for school districts nationwide. A collateral (and intended) impact will be a 
contribution to the education of all stakeholders and those interested in the dynamics and 
implications of school gun policy. This research is intended to stand as a resource for 
stakeholders such as legislators, parents, and employees to equip them to engage in the 
policy debate and to empower their participation in making informed decisions about 
school district weapons policy. 
The literature is filled with commentary and proposals about what schools should 
do on this issue and what policy they should adopt. Robert Birnbaum puts it best when he 
divides the two competing policy narratives into MoreGuns verses BanGuns. Advocates 
for arming school employees (MoreGuns) cite the need for school staff to become first 
responders in order to provide protection in the event of an active shooter scenario.18 
They say allowing concealed weapons provides a deterrent because a shooter would not 
know who is carrying a weapon and therefore would likely choose another target.19 In 
addition, they also assert that gun prohibitions only make schools more vulnerable 
because the bad guys know staff are unarmed.20 With law enforcement response times of 
                                                 
16 “Enrollment in California Public School Districts 1415,” California Department of Education, 
accessed January 10, 2016, dq.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/content.asp.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Mark A. Velez, Guns, Violence, and School Shootings: A Policy Change to Arm Some Teachers and 
School Personnel, Selected Works, 2013, http://works.bepress.com/mark_velez/1.  
19 Ibid.  
20 Kopel, “Pretend Gun-Free School Zones.”  
5 
20 minutes to an hour in rural areas, the MoreGuns folks assert that arming school 
employees is a prudent decision.21 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has noted 
the special vulnerability of rural schools and has acknowledged that armed citizen 
responders should be anticipated.22 Lastly, the MoreGuns advocates are supporters of 
gun rights in general and big Second Amendment supporters. One of the most detailed 
resources on the subject of guns in schools is the National Rifle Association’s (NRA’s) 
National School Shield Program. Not surprisingly, it advocates for more guns in schools 
via more school resource officers and qualified school personnel.23 For example, 
Congressman Asa Hutchinson (R-Ark) headed the NRA taskforce and supports weapon 
carrying for school employees in his home state of Arkansas.24  
As passionate as the MoreGuns advocacy is, so is the BanGuns advocacy. Former 
New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg pledged $50 million dollars to his group 
Everytown for Gun Safety to help fight the NRA.25 The BanGuns constituency believes 
the gun problem cannot be solved by adding more guns. This constituency is comprised 
of school administrators, teachers’ unions, law enforcement agencies, higher education 
officials, campus police chiefs, some student body associations, and the Brady Center to 
Reduce Gun Violence.26 It is ironic that with an abundance of gun legislation proposing 
to lessen gun restrictions on primary, secondary, and higher education campuses, the 
recipients of the legislation are overwhelming opposed to adding more guns.27 Their 
                                                 
21 Michael E. Buerger, and Geoffrey E. Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes,” FBI Law 
Enforcement Bulletin (September 2010).  
22 Ibid.  
23 Asa Hutchinson, Report of the National School Shield Task Force, National School Shield, 2013, 
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/671142/nss-final.pdf.  
24 Kim Severson, “Guns at School? If There’s a Will, There Are Ways,” New York Times, September 
27, 2013, sec. U.S., http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/28/us/guns-at-school-if-theres-a-will-there-are-
ways.html.  
25 Leigh Ann Caldwell, and Kevin Bohn, “Bloomberg to Spend $50 Million to Challenge NRA on 
Gun Safety,” CNN News, April 16, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/15/us/bloomberg-gun-safety-
initiative/index.html.  
26 Robert Birnbaum, “Ready, Fire, Aim: The College Campus Gun Fight” (presented at the 2012 




chief argument is increased risk due to the presence of firearms. A recent accident where 
a Utah teacher accidentally shot herself is a good example.28 Although shooting herself is 
bad enough, if she had accidentally shot another staff member or student there would 
have been a great deal more public outrage. Utah has been allowing concealed carry on 
campuses for many years and has been heralded by the MoreGuns constituency as an 
example to follow.29 The BanGuns constituency can now use Utah as rebuttal to the 
argument that accidents never happen. Other concerns on this side of the issue include 
increased liability, confusion during emergencies over who has a weapon, what level of 
training is appropriate when a teacher may have to shoot their own student, and that the 
unknown specter of guns on campus creates fear and paranoia that is not conducive to a 
healthy learning environment.30  
The training element is one that is hotly debated and one where the BanGuns 
folks seem to have the upper hand. What is the minimum amount of training required to 
enable a layperson to develop an appropriate mindset and become proficient in handling a 
handgun under volatile, unpredictable, and stressful situations? For law enforcement and 
security personnel, a minimum of 24 hours of training is required for firearm 
certification, but the initial basic training is not enough, accurately shooting a weapon, 
especially under pressure, is a perishable skill, and ongoing training and range time is 
critical in order to maintain proficiency.31 BanGuns advocacy says that educators are not 
warriors and cannot be trained to become so.32 Lastly, they also claim that adding more 
guns will not provide a meaningful deterrent because it will not stop the individuals who 
are mentally ill or suicidal.33 If anything, it increases the likelihood they choose a target 
where they know they will encounter armed individuals. It could become somewhat of a 
                                                 
28 Zoe Schlanger, “In Utah, Teachers Can Carry Guns into School and Not Tell Anyone,” Newsweek, 
September 11, 2014, http://www.newsweek.com/utah-teachers-can-carry-guns-school-and-not-tell-anyone-
269923.  
29 Kopel, “Pretend Gun-Free School Zones.”  
30 Birnbaum, “Ready, Fire, Aim: The College Campus Gun Fight.”  
31 Paul Rackley, “Perishable Skills,” May 22, 2013, American Rifleman, 
http://www.americanrifleman.org/articles/2013/5/22/perishable-skills/.  
32 Birnbaum, “Ready, Fire, Aim: The College Campus Gun Fight.”  
33 Ibid. 
7 
“suicide by cop” scenario. For some shooters, dying is part of their plan. “Take everyone 
down, turn the guns on the cop, take out myself. Perfecto,” were the words written in 
preparation for an attack at Connetquot High School in 2007.34 In a study of 48 shooters 
conducted by Dr. Peter Langman, 46 percent died by suicide, thereby ending the attack.35 
In addition, many of the suicides occurred after police arrived and engaged the shooter 
with gunfire.36 Figure 1 depicts Langman’s findings for school shooting outcomes.  
Figure 1.  Resolution/Outcome of School Shooting Attacks 
 
Source: Langman, “On-Scene Behavior of School Shooters.” 
This thesis uses Birnbaum’s MoreGuns and BanGuns policy option 
characterizations and uses them as the foundation for actual policy, rather than as the 
description of an ideology. A third policy option is also introduced: SomeGuns. 
                                                 
34 Peter Langman, “Ten Lessons Learned from School Shootings and Foiled Attacks,” July 31, 2014, 
https://schoolshooters.info/sites/default/files/ten_lessons_1.1.pdf.  
35 Peter Langman, “On-Scene Behavior of School Shooters: The Resolution of Rampage Attacks,” 
August 12, 2015, https://schoolshooters.info/sites/default/files/on_scene_behavior_1.1_0.pdf.  
36 Ibid.  
8 
BanGuns, detailed in Chapter III, is the appropriate policy option for those districts who 
lack sufficient capacity and/or who are unwilling to incur any risk associated with 
firearms. MoreGuns, detailed in Chapter IV, acknowledges the cultural and capacity 
considerations for those school districts that want to adopt an aggressive security posture 
by adding firearms on campus. Key decision criteria and analysis of issues, such as 
liability, insurance, and training, are outlined along with the application of relevant risk 
management considerations and controls. Chapter V details the SomeGuns policy option, 
which is founded on the concept that not all firearms should be prohibited and therefore 
an acceptable compromise can be achieved. The SomeGuns policy option provides 
reduced risk and liability for the school district, restricts who can carry a firearm and 
requires less oversight than the MoreGuns policy approach.  
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope of this research and output is focused on California K-12 school 
districts. University and adult educational environments have different legal and property 
rights applications, and those are not contemplated or considered within this body of 
work.  
One assumption of the research is that there is no one correct nor universally 
applicable outcome; rather, there are possible options for every school district applicable 
to the unique environment, context, values, current capabilities and competencies (or 
those that could exist), and risk tolerance. The measure of effectiveness for each criteria 
under consideration is whether the risk associated with each criterion has been managed 
(or can be) in an acceptable manner. This research makes the assumption that given the 
current legal and social environment, there is no “one size fits all” answer; the same 
decision-making framework and process can be used regardless of whether the outcome 
supports BanGuns, MoreGuns, or SomeGuns. 
F. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Much has been published on this subject in the form of pro-gun commentary, anti-
gun commentary, legal analysis of case law, legal analysis of gun laws, and even 
proposals to change existing gun laws. There is a plethora of news articles stating 
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opinions from legislators, governors, scholars, lawyers, school officials, school 
employees, union officials, student body organizations, the National Rifle Association, 
parents who have lost children in shooting related incidents, and parents who have not. 
The list is long and the opinions are delivered with fervor. Although there is an 
abundance of material on the subject of guns in schools, there is little that is directly 
related to the decision-making process of whether to arm school employees. Therefore, 
this review includes materials, which if taken together, can support the ideology of a 
decision-making framework.  
The relevant information used for this review is organized into the following 
categories: 
• Gun laws 
• Decision making and management 
• Parsing the issue 
• Proposals and case studies 
• Legal liability  
 
1. Gun Laws 
For some, the issue of guns (whether in schools or not) starts and stops with their 
interpretation of the Second Amendment. For more than 70 years, gun bans were 
successfully defended and upheld due to an interpretation of the Second Amendment 
known as the collective rights interpretation. This interpretation believes the Second 
Amendment merely granted states the right to form militias. Under this interpretation, 
individual rights are not considered.37 An individual rights interpretation views the 
Second Amendment as providing the right for individuals to keep and bear arms absent 
involvement in, or presence of, any militia. In District of Columbia v. Heller in 2008, the 
Supreme Court changed the long-standing collective rights interpretation and held that 
the Second Amendment applies to and protects and individual’s right to keep and bear 
                                                 
37 Amy Hetzner, “Comment: Where Angels Tread: Gun-Free School Zone Laws and an Individual 
Right to Bear Arms,” Marquette Law Review, 95 no. 359 (2011): 361–408.    
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arms.38 Although the Heller decision upheld the individual rights interpretation, it did not 
provide an absolute right to carry a firearm any time and any place an individual chooses. 
Within the boundaries of the Second Amendment and the Heller ruling, each state 
has the authority to regulate firearms as they determine appropriate. This includes 
regulations for purchasing, ownership; use of, and, as it relates to this research, whether 
individuals can carry handguns in California K-12 schools.39 According to the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), as it relates to issuing concealed weapons 
permits, states can be classified into the following categories: 
• No-issue: The state does not permit residents or nonresidents to carry 
concealed handguns. 
• May-issue: The state applies discretion in granting permits to carry 
concealed handguns. 
• Shall-issue: Issuing authorities are required to issue a permit to an 
applicant that fulfills the objective statutory criteria if no statutory reason 
for denial exists. 
• Permit not required: States do not require a permit to carry a concealed 
handgun.40 
California is a “may issue,” state and each county law enforcement jurisdiction 
determines through the permitting process whether there is good cause to issue the 
permit.41 If approved, the individual is granted a permit and may carry a concealed 
weapon “at times or circumstances” specified in the permit. It is important to note that 
having a permit does not allow an individual to carry the weapon at all times; he or she is 
subject to the permit conditions. Violation of the permit conditions may be cause for 
revocation.42 In addition, in some jurisdictions, like Kern County, applicants who desire 
                                                 
38 “District of Columbia v Heller,” Casebriefs [blog], accessed October 4, 2014, 
http://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/constitutional-law/constitutional-law-keyed-to-chemerinsky/the-
federal-judicial-power/district-of-columbia-v-heller/.  
39 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Gun Control States’ Laws and Requirements for 
Concealed Carry Permits Vary across the Nation (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, 2012).  
40 Ibid., 




to carry a concealed weapon at their place of employment must submit a letter of 
acknowledgement/permission from their employer.43 For school district employees, such 
a letter would come from the school superintendent or school board authority. The laws 
pertaining to gun ownership, use, and concealed carry are found in the California Penal 
Code,44 and each state has its particular version.45  
Although California is considered a “may issue” state, that status has been 
recently undermined in the decision regarding Edward Peruta v. County of San Diego. In 
the Peruta decision, United States Court for the Ninth Circuit ruled, “San Diego County’s 
rules requiring individuals to show good cause … beyond a mere desire to carry a gun” 
when applying for a concealed weapons permit violated the Second Amendment. This 
ruling essentially turned San Diego into a “shall issue” county. Shortly after the ruling, 
San Diego was “inundated” by applications for concealed carry permits.46 As predicted 
by the California Attorney General Kamala Harris, the Peruta decision quickly extended 
its reach beyond San Diego and has been used to challenge the concealed weapon 
application process in Kern County (Kent Williams v. City of Bakersfield) and Yolo 
County (Richards v. Prieto). Since its original decision, the court has agreed to hear the 
case en banc and oral arguments were heard on June 16, 2015. The outcome of this case 
could fundamentally change the concealed-carrying permitting process throughout 
California. 
In addition to the California Penal Code, guns are further regulated specific to 
schools via the California Gun Free School Zone Act (GFSZA).47 The GFSZA prohibits 
any person from possessing a firearm in a place the person knows to be or reasonable 
                                                 
43 Kern County, “Standard Initial and Renewal Application for License to Carry a Concealed 
Weapon,” Kern County Sheriffs Office, April 16, 2014, 
http://www.kernsheriff.com/misc/FormsApps/Documents/CCW_Application_2015_2016%20%28New%2
9.pdf.  
44 Harris, California Firearms Laws Summary.  
45 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Gun Control States’ Laws and Requirements.  
46 Jill Cowan, “O.C. ‘Inundated’ with Hundreds of Concealed Weapons Applications,” L.A. Times, 
February 26, 2014, http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/26/local/la-me-ln-oc-concealed-weapons-
applications-20140225.  
47 “Penal Code Section 626-626.11,” http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-
bin/displaycode?section=pen&group=00001-01000&file=626-626.11.  
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should know is a school zone.48 “School zone” means an area in, or on the grounds of, a 
public or private K-12 school or within a distance of 1,000 feet from the school 
grounds.49 There are few exceptions to the prohibition, but one applicable to this research 
is that an individual may carry a concealed weapon on a school campus upon receiving 
written permission from the superintendent or school authority.50 This means school 
superintendents have the authority to allow concealed weapons (i.e., arming school 
employees) should they desire to do so. Notwithstanding the requirement to obtain 
written permission to bring a concealed weapon onto campus, there are a number of 
exceptions to this requirement as well as various interpretations, which muddle effective 
enforcement. However, on October 10, 2015, the California Legislature chaptered Senate 
bill (SB) 707 to amend the existing GFSZA and to remove the exemption that previously 
allowed those with a concealed weapons permit to carry their weapon on school 
grounds.51 
Guns are regulated in California to an almost exhaustive detail;52 therefore, a 
thorough knowledge of the applicable gun laws in the jurisdiction where the school 
resides is essential for effective policy consideration. Understanding the written law is 
not enough, school authorities need to take the extra step to understand how the written 
law is interpreted and enforced in their particular jurisdiction.  
2. Decision Making and Management 
As a result of the liability and potential litigation attached to the issue of guns, this 
research focused on decision-making processes that are based on risk management 
principles fostered by the Insurance Institute of America. Risk management is a 
discipline that strives to minimize the adverse effects of accidental or unintentional losses 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 626.9:(b).  
49 Ibid., 626.9:(e)(1).  
50 Ibid., 626.9:(b).  
51 “Senate Bill 707, Chapter 766,” accessed January 23, 2016, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/15-
16/bill/sen/sb_0701-0750/sb_707_bill_20151010_chaptered.pdf.  
52 Harris, California Firearms Laws Summary.  
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to an organization.53 Risk management is both a decision-making process and a 
management process. As a management process, it includes the functions of “planning, 
organizing, leading, and controlling.”54 As a decision-making process, it involves the 
following sequential steps: 
1. Identify and analyze exposures/risk assessment. 
2. Examining and evaluating options for dealing with the exposure/risk. 
3. Selecting the apparently best risk management techniques/options. 
4. Implementing the chosen techniques/options. 
5. Monitor results to determine effectiveness.55 
Although rooted in the insurance industry, the risk management process provides 
an applicable framework for use in decision making where any type of risk presents the 
possibility of unintended or undesired loss to an organization. Recognizing its value, the 
comptroller general of the United States hosted a forum in 2008 “to discuss strengthening 
the use of risk management principles in homeland security.”56 One of the chief purposes 
of the forum was “to advance a national dialogue on applying risk management to 
homeland security” because the nation cannot fully protect against all risks. Recognizing 
this reality, using the risk management process helps “policymakers assess risk, 
strategically allocate finite resources, and take actions under conditions of uncertainty.”57 
In his presentation at the forum, Norman Rabkin, Managing Director of GAO’s 
Homeland Security and Justice Team, noted that Congress has recognized the value of 
risk management and its ability to assist policymakers, thereby charging federal agencies 
with incorporating the use of risk management principles into their program planning and 
                                                 
53 George Head, and Stephen Horn, Essentials of Risk Management, 3rd ed. (Malvern, PA: Insurance 
Institute of America, 2003), http://www.theinstitutes.org/guide/designations/associate-risk-management-
armtm, xi.  
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 1.4. 
56 Comptroller General of the United States, Highlights of a Forum: Strengthening the Use of Risk 




budgeting processes.58 His summary of the GAO framework is analogous to that of the 
Insurance Institute of America. Figure 2 illustrates how the component parts connect to 
form a cycle. It is important to note the interconnections of ongoing information and 
communication, which serve to provide ongoing feedback and additional data that is 
continuously feed into the cycle to ensure well-informed action or policy. 
1. Set strategic goals and objectives, and determine constraints. 
2. Assess risks. 
3. Evaluate alternatives for addressing these risks. 
4. Select the appropriate alternatives. 
5. Implement the alternatives and monitor the progress made and results 
achieved.59  
Figure 2.  Relationship of the Risk Management Framework Components 
 
Source: Comptroller General of the United States, Highlights of a Forum. 




The principles of risk management and the risk management process have been 
increasingly adopted and incorporated into decision-making processes by many 
government agencies, including the U.S. Army. Its version, composite risk management, 
is also a five-step process, based on the same risk management principles, and its 
narrative provides more detail that is easier to translate and apply to the assessment of 
guns in schools: 
1. “Identify hazards to the force. Consider all aspects of current and future 
situations, environments, and known historical problem areas.”60  
Application of this element would include an assessment of the culture, 
demographic, identifying resources, capabilities, objectives, and policy 
goals. 
 
2. “Assess hazards to determine risks. Assess the impact of each hazard in 
terms of potential loss and cost based on probability and severity.”61  
Application of this element includes evaluating the risk posed by the 
presence of guns. Is there a difference between arming employees versus 
having armed security or police officers present? What are the storage, 
training, and ammunition requirements? What are the worst-case scenarios 
for various policy decisions? 
 
3. “Develop controls and make risk decisions. Develop control measures that 
eliminate the hazard or reduce its risk. As control measures are developed, 
risks are re-evaluated until the residual risk is at a level where the benefits 
outweigh the cost.”62  
Application of this element includes an evaluation of the available and 
feasible control measures that can effectively control/mitigate or transfer 
the risk of a gun policy (either pro or against). 
 
4. “Implement controls that eliminate the hazards or reduce their risks.”63  
Regardless of the policy position, the school district should formally adopt 
the policy at the governing board level. This provides the authority for 
implementation and enforcement. 
                                                 
60 Composite Risk Management, University North Carolina Charlotte, 2010, 
http://arotc.uncc.edu/sites/arotc.uncc.edu/files/MSL%20401%20Officership%20Section%2006%20-
%20Composite%20Risk%20Management.pdf.  
61 Ibid.  
62 Ibid.  
63 Ibid.  
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5. “Supervise and evaluate. Enforce standards and controls. Evaluate the 
effectiveness of controls and adjust/update as necessary. Ensure lessons 
learned are fed back into the systems for future planning.”64 
Risk management does not surface as a common decision-making framework in 
literature; however, its process and techniques provide relevant guidance and direction 
for policy assessment. Policy focus is shifted from subjective desires, agendas, or 
entrenched ideologies to a process that is objective and substantive. Moreover, risk 
management is a mechanism that helps ensure the greatest risks are identified and 
assessed in a way that leads to effective mitigation or control. The process also serves as 
the foundation for effective communication of outcomes and policy decisions.  
3. Proposals, Case Studies, and Legislation 
Although the issue of whether to arm school employees is vigorously debated, 
there are some school districts that have carefully contemplated their options and 
implemented policies they believe suit their needs. The most comprehensive regulatory 
framework and guidance comes from Texas and several schools have moved forward 
implementing the provisions of the Texas Protection of Children Act (Texas Act).65 The 
act creates a school marshal program, whereby a school employee can be designated as a 
school marshal, trained, and armed. Details of the Texas Act include the following: 
• Voluntary participation; the board of trustees selects and appoints not 
more than one marshal per 400 students. 
• Recognition of school marshals under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 
and licensed under the Occupations Code as having arrest authority and all 
authority given peace officers, except traffic enforcement. They are not 
entitled to state benefits for peace officers. 
• Complete of 80 hours of instruction focusing on preventing school 
shootings and securing victims during a shooting event, demonstrating 
proficiency with a handgun, legal issues relating to peace officers and the 
use of deadly force, and training for emergency situations requiring the 
use of deadly force.  
                                                 
64 Ibid.  
65 Protection of Texas Children Act (2013).  
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• Submit to and pass a psychological examination to determine if the 
marshal is psychologically fit to carry out the duties in an emergency 
shooting or situation involving an active shooter. 
• Volunteers must bear their own costs for training and licensing. 
• Satisfy all requirements for a concealed handgun license and license 
renewal requirements. 
• School marshals may carry concealed weapons, but if their primary duties 
involve direct contact with students on a regular basis the handgun must 
be kept in a locked, secure location on campus. Only frangible 
ammunition (designed to disintegrate on impact to eliminate ricochet) is 
allowed.66 
The training elements, psychological examination, and other components of the 
program are under the jurisdiction and administered by the Texas Commission on Law 
Enforcement Officer Standards and Education.67 The legislation created a new level of 
law enforcement officer with the concomitant training and certification requirements. 
California’s School Marshal Plan pales in comparison in both detail and authority. 
Simply put, California’s plan proposed an amendment to the Education Code allowing 
school districts to expend general funds to provide training for school marshals.68  Had 
the legislation passed, marshals would have been defined as those who were authorized 
under the Gun Free School Zone Act to possess a firearm at a school site. However, 
school superintendents would have been left with no guidance from the legislature about 
how best to proceed. With its lack of detail, it is perhaps a benefit the bill died in 
committee. 
North Carolina has legislation similar to Texas wherein certification must be in 
accordance with the North Carolina Criminal Justice Education and Training Standards 
Commission.69 The model legislation proposed by the School Shield NRA taskforce 
contains language that requires any training program for school marshals to be pursuant 
to the applicable state agency for setting law enforcement or armed security training 
                                                 
66 Ibid.  
67 Ibid.  
68 California Senate bill 202, California School Marshal Plan (2013).  
69 North Carolina General Assembly 27, Public School Protection/Firearms Amendments (2013).  
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standards.70 Under rules designed for security companies, Arkansas allows employees 
with 60 hours of training to carry concealed weapons.71 A plan for Nevada’s higher 
education campuses proposed allowing professors and full-time employees to carry 
concealed weapons if they underwent the training necessary to become reserve police 
officers (at their own expense); however, the board of regents rejected the plan after 
vigorous opposition from staff and students.72 Some districts require much less training 
or no training at all. Schools that allow individuals who have concealed weapons permits 
to carry on campus, they are staking the safety of students on as little as eight hours of 
training, most of which is not specific to the school environment.73  
The above examples represent the diverse set of options either contemplated or 
implemented in various school districts. Other considerations found in the literature 
involve who is eligible to be armed, who pays for expenses associated with arming 
school personnel, how firearms will be worn or stored, guidelines for when the firearm 
can be used, and how emergency procedures should be adjusted.74 Though these issues 
must be decided at the local school level, school administrators need resources to help 
them navigate the process. The Texas Association of School Boards published an 
excellent resource not only applicable to Texas schools but also useful for schools in 
other states that are looking for key decision criteria. Published in 2014, it was the result 
of the School Safety Task Force, which was charged with studying best practices for 
school multi-hazard emergency operations, including options for having armed 
individuals on school campus. It is a comprehensive document, folding the elements of 
the Texas Protection of Children Act into its contents thereby providing an excellent 
planning resource for the implementation of the Texas Act and detailing how firearms 
integrate into the overall mission of emergency planning.75 
                                                 
70 Hutchinson, Report of the National School Shield Task Force. 
71 Severson, “Guns at School?”  
72 Kopel, “Pretend Gun-Free School Zones.”  
73 Kern County, “Standard Initial and Renewal Application.”  
74 Velez, “Guns, Violence, and School Shootings.”  
75 Texas Protection of Children Act (2013).  
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4. School District Legal Liability  
Pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act, a school district is liable for injuries 
proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee when that employee is acting 
within the scope of employment.76 With very limited immunities, public employees are 
liable for their torts, and public entities are vicariously liable for the torts of their 
employees.77 School districts are generally liable for the actions of their employees under 
the doctrine of respondeat superior.78 This doctrine, which is Latin for “let the master 
answer,” holds an employer liable for the authorized action of an employee.79 If a school 
district authorized employees to carry a concealed weapon within the scope of their job, 
the district is potentially liable for any injury or damage resulting from the use or 
presence of the weapon. In addition to being responsible/liable for the actions of their 
employees, employers are also responsible for the safety of their employees. The 
California Injury and Illness Prevention Program (IIPP) requires employers to train 
employees in the hazards specific to their jobs. Training in firearms safety becomes an 
employer requirement when the firearm is incorporated as a potential job function. 
Training and informing non-weapon-carrying personnel of potential hazards and policy is 
also required.80 
In loco parentis is another Latin term applicable to this research. Meaning “in 
place of the parent,” it establishes the duty of school personnel under prescribed legal 
principles of negligence. Basically, educators have a duty to protect their students from 
foreseeable danger and to take reasonable steps to protect them from that danger.81 In 
application, educators owe students the same duty of care and supervision that reasonable 
parents would employ in the same circumstances.  
                                                 
76 California Tort Claims Act, § 810 et seq.  
77 Ibid., §820(a) and 815.2(a).  
78 “California Civil Jury Instructions,” last modified September 2003, https://www.justia.com/trials-
litigation/docs/caci/3700/3701.html.  
79 Ibid. 
80 “Subchapter 7. General Industry Safety Orders,” California Department of Industrial Relations, 
1991, www.dir.ca.gov/title8/3202.html.  
81 “In Loco Parentis,” Education Law, accessed January 17, 2015, http://educational-law.org/345-in-
loco-parentis.html.  
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It is an established principle under standards of legal liability that a duty 
voluntarily assumed must be performed with care. Whether the assumed duty is 
performed with reasonable care, such as protecting students via concealed weapons, or 
failure thereof, will be a decision for the trier of fact (judge or jury).82 Because there is no 
statutory requirement in any state for schools to implement weapons programs or to allow 
employees to carry firearms, there is no liability for declining to do so. However, once 
the duty is accepted by implementing a firearm policy or allowing individuals to carry 
concealed weapons on campus, the district likely incurs liability for injury or damage.83 
In her article, “When Victims Become Responsible: Deputizing School Personnel and 
Destruction of Qualified Immunity,” Miljia Zgonjanin concludes,  
School districts should avoid deputizing their faculty and staff. Educators 
are not trained law enforcement, and they should not be the first line of 
defense against a threat of violence. To require educators to do more than 
teach will expose them, as well as the district, to liability beyond their 
control.84 
G. EVALUATIVE CRITERIA 
Using the policy narratives of BanGuns verses MoreGuns,85 produce the essential 
criteria from each line of thinking to use for the foundational elements and by using other 
existing policies and programs, determine if additional criteria need to be added. The 
foundational elements, which will be detailed in policy option Chapters III, IV, and V as 
applicable, include the following: 
• Social/cultural acceptance 
• Course and scope of employment 
• Voluntary carry 
• Employment/legal liability 
• Legal parameters (gun laws) 
• Insurance 
                                                 
82 Miljia Zgonjanin, “Chalk Talks: When Victims Become Responsible: Deputizing School Personnel 
and Destruction of Qualified Immunity,” Journal of Law & Education 455, no. 43 (2014): 455.  
83 Ibid.  
84 Ibid.  
85 Birnbaum, “Ready, Fire, Aim: The College Campus Gun Fight.”  
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• Training and certification 
• Authorized use policy 
The logic and measurement for assessing and validating policy options uses the 
established principles and techniques of risk management, which include:  
• Risk avoidance—the decision to not proceed or perform an activity.  
• Risk acceptance—the decision to proceed and accept or tolerate the risk 
presented or inherent in the activity. 
• Risk mitigation—implementing measures to control the risk or reduce it to 
an acceptable level. 
• Risk transfer—establishing a means to transfer the risk to another party, 
usually through contracts or insurance. 
These elements have been selected because of the flexibility they lend to the 
decision maker in options to reduce or mitigate risk. They are proven techniques and 
provide a method for evaluating whether the risk has in fact been reduced or impacted. In 
addition, the steps of the risk management process (identifying risk, assessing risk, 
identifying risk mitigation approaches, selecting risk mitigation methods, and 
implementation and monitoring) are cyclical. As one decision or action impacts another, 
the risks must to be evaluated continuously and assessed to determine if a particular 
course of action actually increases risk (by creating another hazard) or reduces risk. If a 
decision increases risk or introduces another hazard, then the above techniques must be 
deployed in order to mitigate and manage risk effectively. For instance, one could argue 
that providing all employees with handguns in order to respond to an intruder shooter on 
campus may provide a level of increased security, but the hazard of uncontrolled 
weapons in the hands of untrained personnel presents a greater risk than the one initially 
being addressed. Therefore, without appropriate controls it is a risk that should be 
avoided. 
H. METHODOLOGY 
The following information describes the research method used, the primary data 
sources used in the analysis, and the research output.  
22 
1. Policy Option Analysis 
The research follows a policy options analysis using identified criteria from the 
data sources noted above to inform and validate the options of BanGuns, MoreGuns, or 
SomeGuns. The process digested policy elements (from existing policies, programs, and 
published commentary), determined commonalities, evaluated whether fundamental 
elements are common to the decision-making process regardless of outcome, and used 
the criteria to build a model. If the risk is not adequately reduced or managed, the return 
on investment is considered insufficient and thus policy is impacted. 
2. Data Sources 
The following data sources were used to cull, confirm, and establish the essential 
decision-making elements listed above: 
• Existing legislation and policy including, but not limited to, those from 
Utah (where concealed weapons are allowed without the knowledge or 
consent of the school district required), Texas (where new legislation 
provides a structure for arming school employees), and Israel (which has 
armed large numbers of school employees for several years). These 
provide a broad range of policy elements and decision-making context. 
The diversity of these examples provides a wide-lens into the cultural and 
local context that drives outcomes.  
• Case law applicable to legal liability, employment liability, and gun law 
specific to California. These are necessary parameters that bound the 
decision making and must be recognized and considered. 
• Proposed policy (Nevada Board of Regents) or legislation (California 
School Marshal Program) that failed to pass or become implemented can 
also provide insight as to where gaps in decision making existed or where 
some criteria garnered more weight than others (i.e., social acceptance). 
 
3. Output 
The central aim of this thesis is to pull key elements of existing policies and 
regulations, identify potential gaps, and apply all the elements against risk management 
principles and decision making to determine a holistic framework or guide. In doing so, 
the goal is to take a decision that can be subjective in nature and provide an objective 
process for developing policy. The finished product should be an actionable framework, 
reflected in a decision tree or algorithm, which can stand as a resource to inform decision 
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making whether by school authorities, legislators, or other stakeholders. It is 
contemplated that a simple Boolean fault tree can provide the structure for the 
framework, outlining dependent steps and milestones which must be answered 
affirmatively in order to arrive at an outcome supported by risk management logic. The 
framework is illustrated in Appendix B.  
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II. WHY RISK MANAGEMENT IS NEEDED TO ADDRESS 
PRIMARY EDUCATION SHOOTINGS AND HOW IT RELATES TO 
POLICY DECISIONS 
Risk management is being smart about taking chances. 
— Douglas Hubbard 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Robert Brinbaum characterizes the MoreGuns/BanGuns debate as a wicked 
problem,86 and he is correct. Wicked problems are distinguished as having the following: 
an illusive source, no clear solution or optimal solution, no opportunity for trial and error 
(as every attempt carries the potential to be good or bad and make the situation better or 
worse), its foundations can be the symptoms of other problems, solutions vary based on 
the explanation of the problem for which there is no logical way to determine, and are 
wholly unique.87 As it applies to school shootings, research has shown there is no clear 
profile of a school shooter, and there are no definitive indicators to stop attacks before the 
perpetrator strikes.88 There are behavioral indicators that rely on the expertise of school 
professionals, but these do not guarantee an intervention will be successful. With the case 
of several school shooters, the school disciplined the student for inappropriate behavior 
(e.g., Kip Kinkel was expelled for bringing a gun onto campus) only to have the student 
leave campus and return to carry out a shooting rampage.89 In addition, decisions to arm 
employees or provide armed security are not guarantees a shooter will be stopped before 
killing or injuring victims, and they may even introduce a climate of fear or anxiety, 
thereby creating a new problem or worsening tensions on campus. Whether or not 
schools should arm employees, as a solution to stopping an armed intruder, is indeed a 
wicked problem; one that this thesis does not seek to resolve in a definitive way. Rather, 
                                                 
86 Ibid.  
87 Horst W. J. Rittel, and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy 
Sciences 4 (1973): 155–69.  
88 Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Texas State University, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in 
the United States between 2000 and 2013 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2013).  
89 Langman, “Ten Lessons Learned from School Shootings and Foiled Attacks.”  
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this research seeks to use risk management principles to support the decision-making 
process. Birnbaum asserts that MoreGuns and BanGuns groups persist in their advocacy 
because they are promoting goals using data and arguments processed through the lens of 
their intrinsic values.90 This prevents the objective assessment of the issue. Instead of 
basing policy on the “assessment of empirical evidence, empirical evidence is selectively 
collected, interpreted, and used to support a priori commitments to a policy view.”91 This 
makes MoreGuns and BanGuns ideologies self-validating because selective data and 
arguments will always support and reinforce the desired interpretation.92 The use of risk 
management principles introduces objective decision making where process drives 
outcome and ideology rather than the other way around. Brinbaum puts it as “ready (have 
an ideology), fire (attack using the ideology), and then aim (construct a narrative).”93 In a 
risk-management driven approach, the ideology and resulting policy come as the end-
result of the process, thereby righting the sequence to ready (setting goals and 
objectives), aim (assessing risks and constraints), and then fire (implementing 
corresponding policy). 
B. BANGUNS 
A BanGuns ideology primarily comes as a result of any of the following:  
• An unwillingness to incur any liability or any level of risk associated with 
firearms, resulting in risk avoidance. 
• A culture that fundamentally does not support the presence of firearms on 
campus (risk avoidance). 
• A determination that adequate insurance cannot be obtained or is cost 
prohibitive (the inability to transfer risk). 
• A lack of capacity/capability to administer a weapons policy (inability to 
mitigate risk). 
A BanGuns approach is also appropriate for districts where their limited resources 
have already been allocated to early intervention programs, such as school psychologists 
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or social workers who implement behavioral intervention strategies, and strive to address 
the underlying school culture. 
C. MOREGUNS 
A MoreGuns ideology results when culture and capacity support firearms on 
campus. To date, this ideology has been most prevalent in states with liberal gun laws, 
which does not include California. In these instances the following characteristics apply: 
• Parent and employee groups support guns on campus and no opposition is 
expressed toward arming staff or security personnel. 
• The use of a firearm is a desired part of the job to provide enhanced 
security on campus (acceptance of risk). However, “To be clear, 
confronting an active shooter should never be a requirement of any non-
law enforcement personnel’s job;” direct response is an individual 
choice.94 
• Attitudes are accepting of voluntary carry by personnel who have a license 
to carry a concealed weapon. 
• The district is willing to incur liability, has adequate insurance in place 
and uses indemnification agreements where appropriate, thereby achieving 
adequate risk transfer. 
• Training for persons authorized to carry a firearm is robust and consistent 
with Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) or other as prescribed 
by policy or regulation (risk mitigation). 
D. SOMEGUNS 
The SomeGuns ideology is a middle ground where neither gun advocates nor gun 
opponents achieve their fundamental goal. This approach is characterized primarily by 
the following: 
• The culture may be opposed to arming civilian employees but does not 
oppose armed security or law enforcement personnel. 
• A willingness to incur some liability but in a limited fashion (risk 
acceptance). 
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• Adequate insurance is in place and contractual liability pertaining to the 
use of outside agencies or firms has been addressed (risk transfer). 
• Training for persons authorized to carry a firearm is robust and consistent 
with Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) or other as prescribed 
by policy or regulation (risk mitigation). 
E. CONCLUSION 
Application of the risk management decision-making process provides a 
foundation for objective policymaking whether the issue is arming school employees or 
not. While an active shooter is the current black swan considered by most school districts, 
the next black swan may not be related to guns at all.95 On November 5, 2015, a student 
from University of California (UC), Merced, who was armed with an eight- to 10-inch 
blade, perpetrated an attack on campus. He stabbed and injured four individuals before 
being confronted and shot by school police.96 Maybe stabbings are the next black 
swan;97 regardless, school administrators who become accustomed to using a risk 
management driven approach will have policies founded on a solid assessment of risk, 
capability, and culture. The Risk Assessment Matrix for Gun Policy in K-12 Schools 
(risk assessment matrix), shown in Appendix A, illustrates how key decision points move 
from conditions warranting risk avoidance, to conditions supporting policy and 
acceptable levels of risk. The Decision Framework for Determining Concealed Weapons 
Policy in California K-12 Schools (Decision Framework) in Appendix B, illustrates a 
decision-making matrix. While the risk assessment matrix is useful to assess individual 
criteria, the decision framework provides collective criteria assessment requiring 
affirmative responses prior to moving forward with policy.  
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III. BANGUNS 
Armageddon is not around the corner. This is only what people of 
violence want us to believe.  
— Michael Palin 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The BanGuns ideology is driven first by culture and then by capability. Because 
of the complexity of implementing a gun policy, each district must assess its own culture, 
resources, and capabilities in order to determine a course of action appropriate for its 
environment. Districts that take a BanGuns stance believe there is more liability and risk 
in allowing guns onto campus than there is in prohibiting them. For these districts, safety, 
security, and emergency procedures are written with response options that do not include 
firearms. A BanGuns ideology is the appropriate stance for many districts. Furthermore, a 
decision otherwise would increase risk, introduce potential adverse liability, deplete, or 
strain inadequate resources, and most importantly, strain or fracture the culture of the 
district. A BanGuns ideology is also the appropriate choice for districts that are risk 
averse or not willing to incur any level of risk associated with firearms. Board policies 
articulating the BanGuns ideology are the logical and necessary response for many school 
districts. 
B. CULTURE 
Culture is by far the most significant factor supporting or driving a BanGuns 
ideology. Even the most well-defined and well-intentioned policies have not been 
implemented because the culture did not support brining guns onto campus.98 According 
to Jeffrey Connor, “To understand the culture, you need to think like an anthropologist in 
order to assess the norms and values shared by those who work in the unit. Leaders 
ignore the importance of culture at their peril.”99 This is true for school districts whose 
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sites are led by principals, who is led by a superintendent, who is governed by an elected 
school board. These school authorities are all influenced and impacted by the parents and 
communities they serve. It is this community that elects the school board and the board in 
turn hires the superintendent. It is not uncommon for a superintendent to be released from 
their contract or not renewed for another term because of “cultural” conflicts.  
The Nevada Board of Regents is a good example of smart governance driven by 
mindful attention to culture. University Regent Stavros Anthony, who is also a police 
officer, introduced a gun policy that allowed arming employees.100 The policy, which has 
been cited by others as a good model to follow, addressed the necessary elements of 
which employees were eligible to carry, what level of training was required, and how the 
costs associated with training were to be paid. Although it was a well-articulated policy, 
it was rejected by the regents after vigorous opposition from staff and students.101 
Chancellor Jim Rogers of the University of Nevada said, “I think it’s a media nightmare. 
I think it’s a public relations nightmare.”102 Opposition to arming staff seems to be the 
primary response in the education community. Ken Trump, a consultant with the National 
School Safety and Security Services, says, “The vast majority of teachers want to be 
armed with textbooks and computers …to teach in the classroom—not guns.” He also 
asserts that most school boards lack the expertise necessary to appropriately supervise 
staff with weapons.103 A California bill failed to pass in 2013, with Senator Leland Yee 
(D-Sacramento), who has worked as a school psychologist, saying “I don’t know of any 
educator who would be interested in packing a gun into a school.”104 No matter how well 
intentioned the plan is, Jeffrey Connor is right; leaders ignore the importance of culture at 
their peril. 
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The other key element supporting a BanGuns ideology is capability. School 
authorities must address many criteria in formulating and implementing sound gun policy 
to appropriately manage the risk guns inherently bring. Not only do the criteria require 
financial resources but also personnel resources for implementation, participation, and 
oversight. These are not one-time resource commitments but long-term. Districts that do 
not believe they can meet the challenges of the financial resource commitment or the 
personnel commitment rightly decline implementation of a gun policy, settling instead on 
a BanGuns ideology. To do otherwise brings unmanaged risk to the district. 
A determination that a district lacks capability to arm employees does not 
correlate to increasing risk on campus from a potential shooter. Despite conventional 
wisdom, that most school shooting incidents are over before law enforcement arrives, 
Peter Langman has studied school shooting incidents and his analysis indicates that law 
enforcement plays a critical role in neutralizing school many shooters.105 Because the 
“end” of a school shooting event is not a given nor can be predicted, adopting a BanGuns 
approach is a valid option. However, school administrators who reject the idea of armed 
personnel solely in favor of physical security are cautioned. As Langman points out, even 
if a shooter cannot get into a building, he or she can still “shoot people in the morning as 
they arrive at school, or wait until schools let out. If a door is locked, they may be able to 
shoot their way through.”106 His point is that a multi-pronged approach is needed and 
that physical security, just like arming employees, has its limits. School administrators 
who want to fully assess whether their culture and capabilities might support some level 
of guns on campus can use the decision matrix shown in Appendix B. The matrix is 
formatted in such a way so as to require every element of the decision criteria to be 
addressed affirmatively in order to proceed. Failure to fully achieve an affirmative 
response on any level indicates a BanGuns ideology is the appropriate choice. 
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D. POLICY 
It is not enough for a school district to decide on a BanGuns stance or to vote 
down a pro-gun proposal. It is important for such districts to promulgate and adopt a 
formal BanGuns board policy. Such a policy is necessary to articulate the district’s 
position, to guide actions (including employee disciplinary actions for violations) with 
respect to guns on campus, and to provide the authority for the district to take action for 
violations. Leaning on the Gun-Free School Zone Act (GFSZA) is not sufficient. 
Differing interpretations and enforcement can leave a district open to inconsistencies that 
jeopardize its desires. On August 28, 2014, the Panama-Buena Vista Union School 
District learned this lesson when its administration called the Bakersfield Police 
Department (BPD) to follow up on a report of a gun on campus. Vice Principal Kent 
Williams, who had a concealed weapons permit, was handcuffed and escorted off campus 
by BPD officers for bringing a gun onto campus in his backpack.107 Debate arose about 
the details and requirements of concealed weapons permits, the Gun-Free School Zone 
Act, and an employer’s right to regulate guns in the workplace. Questions were raised 
about the permit requirements, issued by the Kern County Sheriff’s Department, and 
whether BPD acted prudently in its interpretation of the Gun-Free School Zone Act. 
Ultimately, Mr. Williams lost his employment with the district because he violated 
district policy prohibiting guns at school. Several months after his arrest, Mr. Williams 
filed suit against the City of Bakersfield over his arrest. Mr. Williams’s case is significant 
because it uses the Second Amendment, McDonald v. City of Chicago, and Peruta v. 
County of San Diego as the basis for his suit in providing him the right to possess a gun 
on his person (including a school campus). These cases and his assertions are subject to 
inconsistent interpretation and lack clear reconciliation with the Gun-Free School Zone 
Act; therefore, districts cannot afford to rely on law enforcement alone to prevent 
employees from brining guns onto campus. In Kern County, California, if individuals 
desire to carry a concealed weapon at their place of employment, they must provide a 
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letter of approval from the employer as part of the application process.108 Mr. Williams 
did not have his employer’s permission, but differing interpretations of the Gun-Free 
School Zone Act and his concealed weapons permit by the Bakersfield Police 
Department, Kern County Sheriff’s Department, and the Kern County District Attorney’s 
office, ultimately led to no charges filed against Mr. Williams.109 Hopefully, with the 
October 2015 amendments to the GFSZA, the elimination of the dubious exemption that 
allowed someone with a concealed firearms permit to carry a gun on school property will 
provide more consistent and reliable enforcement in the future. As the case of Williams 
illustrates, a clear board policy is the best and ultimate enforcement weapon; it would 
provide a school board the authority to discipline or terminate an employee for a policy 
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IV. MOREGUNS
Chaos is inherent in all compound things. Strive on with diligence. 
— Buddha 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The basic tenet of the MoreGuns ideology is that self-defense is an inherent right 
and that having armed individuals on a school campus is the only way to afford a 
reasonable defense if faced with an active shooter situation.110 This is a hard ideology to 
defeat logically because many active shooter scenarios are concluded when someone 
confronts the offender with a weapon (either by a civilian or a law enforcement 
officer).111 Although this may be true, it does not mean adding more guns on campuses 
leads to this as an inevitable consequence. Thorough consideration and analysis of issues 
such as culture, liability, insurance, training, and certification are necessary in order to 
establish whether a MoreGuns ideology can be effectively implemented with the risk 
effectively managed.  
B. CULTURE 
Culture may not be the most important factor supporting a MoreGuns ideology, 
but it is a significant consideration. A MoreGuns culture can be characterized as an 
environment of Second Amendment supporters in which firearms are considered a 
normal, inherent part of society rather than a necessary evil that must be managed. This 
view is held most often in states with liberal, rather than conservative, gun laws. In these 
states, board policies to arm employees may not be viewed as radical and acceptance may 
come naturally without complication. In this culture, the sincere answer to gun violence 
is gun defense. California is not a liberal state with respect to gun laws and therefore, a 
MoreGuns culture is less likely to come from a Second Amendment foundation but rather 
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from a pragmatic one. Harrold School District in Texas did not vote to allow employees 
to carry weapons because of a strong Second Amendment ideology; it did this because 
the nearest sheriff’s office is 30 minutes away.112 According to Harrold Superintendent 
David Thweatt, there was no opposition in the community, nor with the school board, 
when the district adopted its policy of arming employees. In fact, the response was in 
essence “Thank you for having the foresight to do something.” CaeRae Reinisch 
specifically enrolled her children in Harrold School District because she felt they would 
be safer, saying “I think it’s a great idea for trained teachers to carry weapons.”113 
California school administrators need to understand that for their community, employee 
groups, and parents to substantiate a MoreGuns ideology, regardless of the foundation, it 
must be supported by the culture. 
C. COURSE AND SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT 
An intrinsic element in the MoreGuns ideology is the committed resolution for 
employees to carry firearms on campus and to use them if necessary as an integrated part 
of their employment. There can be no equivocation on this point. Acknowledging 
firearms as an integrated part of employment and accepting the associated liability 
provides school administrators the incentive and authority to rigorously administer their 
firearms policy. Training, certification, employee selection and authorization to carry, 
insurance, weapon selection, weapon storage, ammunition restrictions, and emergency 
procedures must all be prescribed, regulated, and managed by the school authority. This 
all becomes easier to do when carrying a firearm becomes a job function and therefore 
subject to the employer’s authority.  
D. VOLUNTARY CARRY 
School district administrators who believe their agency lacks the capacity to 
properly execute a firearms policy may adopt a voluntary carry policy in order to shift 
liability and/or the oversight components listed above. In this scenario, employees who 
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hold or obtain valid concealed weapons permits are authorized to carry their weapons on 
campus. Although this may seem like a practical way to provide security without the 
administrative overhead, there are still considerations that must be addressed or else the 
risk and liability to the district will be increased rather than reduced or mitigated. The 
most important feature of a voluntary carry policy is a clear detachment between carrying 
a firearm and the course and scope of employment. There must be no job duty or function 
that requires the use of a firearm; otherwise, the school agency will acquire all the risk 
and liability it seeks to transfer by having a voluntary carry policy. Properly identifying 
concealed carry as permissive is only the first step. Regardless of whether one is pro-gun 
or anti-gun, it is undisputed that firearms accidents do occur. Therefore, it is imperative 
that insurance and hold harmless agreements are a required component of a voluntary 
carry policy. 
E. LEGAL LIABILITY 
California school agencies have liability for the actions and in some instances the 
inactions of its employees in addition to liability for its failure to perform a statutory 
duty. The first category is known by the doctrine of respondeat superior, which is Latin 
for “let the master answer.” The latter is known as statutory liability. Simply put, this 
means tort claims must be supported by an assertion of a failure to perform a statutorily 
required mandate. Because there is no statutory requirement for schools to implement a 
weapons program or to allow employees to carry firearms, there is no liability for 
declining to do so. However, once a duty is accepted, by implementing a firearm policy 
or allowing individuals to carry concealed weapons, the district creates potential adverse 
liability for itself. This liability is found in the established principle that a duty 
voluntarily assumed must be performed with care. Whether or not the assumed duty is 
performed with reasonable care, such as protecting students, or the failure thereof, will be 
a decision for the trier of fact (judge or jury).114 Another potential source of liability 
comes from the doctrine of in loco parentis, which is the Latin term for “in place of the 
parent.” Under tort principles of negligence, K-12 educators owe students a duty to 
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anticipate foreseeable dangers and to take reasonable steps to protect those students from 
that danger.115 To this end, K-12 educators owe the same degree of care and supervision 
to their students that reasonable and prudent parents would employ in the same 
circumstances for their children. Making the decision to arm employees because they had 
no other security policy in place, Sidney Ohio school district Superintendent John Scheu 
said, “We may not stop a shooter from getting into the building. If they want to, they will 
find a way, but if they enter, we can stop them in seconds.”116 Approximately 40 teachers 
among the district’s seven schools are trained to be first responders.117 Bulletproof vests 
as well as handguns are kept in biometric lock safes in various locations throughout the 
district sites.  
While adding trained faculty to its current cadre of armed security at its entrances 
potentially increases security at its schools, the superintendent’s statement “we can stop 
them in seconds” is concerning. It could be argued that the Sidney policy creates for itself 
the duty to stop armed intruders in seconds. When (if) that does not happen, it logically 
follows that the district will have failed to fulfill its duty (even if self imposed) and 
therefore liability may attach. It can be said that, generally, immunity exists if the injury 
results from the public employee’s discretion to undertake an activity, liability if it results 
from his or her negligence in performing it after she or he has made the discretionary 
discretion to do so.  
Providing armed security at schools may be a desired policy approach, but the 
outcomes of doing so should not be exaggerated. There is no evidence that having armed 
personnel on site effectively deters a potential shooter. Unfortunately, there have been 
several school shootings where the perpetrator knew there were armed personnel on site 
yet still continued with his plan.118 A MoreGuns approach should not be portrayed as 
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anything other than a desire to expand response capabilities avoiding any commitments 
that can be used against the district for failure to act. 
As it relates to MoreGuns, the associated liability leaves little margin for error. A 
MoreGuns approach may increase the level of safety, but it also brings the highest level 
of liability to the school agency. Every element of a MoreGuns policy can potentially 
form the basis for a lawsuit and adverse liability. Therefore, schools that adopt this 
ideology must have a high tolerance for risk, strong risk management oversight, and 
rigorous policy administration.  
F. GUN LAWS 
The most significant aspects of California gun law applicable to a MoreGuns 
ideology are those that address licensing, storage, open carry, and some applicable 
exemptions to the Gun Free School Zone Act (GFSZA). Where employees are permitted 
to carry their own weapons on campus, the district must still ensure there is a process to 
verify all firearms are properly licensed. It is illegal to carry a concealed firearm in 
California without a license.119 Penal Code 23635-23690 requires all firearms purchased 
in California to be accompanied with a firearms safety device or an affidavit declaring 
ownership of a Department of Justice approved lock box or gun safe that is capable of 
securing the firearm.120 All firearms must be stored in a way so as to make them 
inaccessible to minors.121 Regardless of whether a school adopts a MoreGuns ideology, it 
is generally illegal to openly carry a firearm in public. The most applicable exception is 
for law enforcement personnel and security guards who have been trained and received 
firearm qualification cards.122 Lastly, although the 2015 amendments to the GFSZA 
removed the exemption for those who carry a concealed weapon permit, it did not 
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remove the exemption that allows individuals to have a firearm and ammunition on 
school grounds if they are contained in the locked trunk of a vehicle.123  
G. INSURANCE AND INDEMNITY 
Litigation and financial considerations are secondary to personal safety yet must 
be part of the MoreGuns ideology. This is because few, if any, school districts have 
reserve funds sufficient to cover the cost of litigation and potential liability associated 
with firearms (or any uninsured risk). California school districts have endured the worst 
financial crisis in decades. One report asserts 89 percent of California school districts 
were unable to guarantee financial solvency.124 If firearms are going to be allowed on a 
school campus, it must be with the acknowledgement that someday the weapon may be 
deployed and someone could be injured. Recently, a Utah teacher with a concealed 
weapons permit accidentally shot herself in the leg.125 Had the discharge injured a 
student or other individual, lawsuits would likely have followed.  
A desperate MoreGuns approach was recently implemented in Pakistan, a country 
that has experienced more school attacks than any other country in the world.126 Within 
months of implementing the policy, an armed teacher accidently shot and killed a 12-
year-old student. The teacher was cleaning the weapon in the staff room when it 
discharged and hit and killed a student immediately.127  
While policy, built on sound risk management techniques, can help reduce the 
likelihood of such occurrences, adequate insurance is an important risk transfer 
component of any MoreGuns policy. Whether a school agency is insured through 
participation in a joint powers authority, a self-insured structure, commercial insurance, 
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or a hybrid of all of these, the school agency administration must confirm there is 
adequate coverage in place. Consultation with the district’s risk manager, and insurance 
coverage attorney if necessary, is recommended to determine the presence, absence, or 
limitation of coverage. Key items to note include the following: who is an insured, 
definition of occurrence (accident or event-based), definition of wrongful act and any 
exclusion that may apply (use of firearm, injuries that were expected or intended, etc.). A 
thorough coverage analysis, which compares the anticipated actions and outcomes of 
school district employees against policy language, and understanding how the claims 
administrator will interpret the policy language in the event a claim both help shape 
policy. The coverage analysis is not limited to whether or not school employees are 
covered within the scope of their employment. For the MoreGuns ideology that includes 
voluntary carry, the analysis needs to determine whether there is any coverage for 
liability associated with a firearm. It seems easy to assume the district would have no 
liability for those who voluntarily carry a firearm; however, the independent actions of 
someone acting in her or his own interests do not absolve the district of liability for what 
occurs on the campus.128 For these reasons, insurance is not only necessary to protect the 
district from its employees’ actions but also from the actions of others.  
A common companion to insurance is an indemnification agreement, and where 
the MoreGuns ideology allows voluntary carry outside the scope of employment, 
indemnification agreements become applicable and important. An indemnification 
agreement is a legal promise whereby one party agrees to stand in the place of another 
financially pursuant to the terms of the agreement. Indemnification agreements are also 
known as “hold harmless agreements.”129 This is an oversimplification, but for the 
purposes of this thesis, it is sufficient to know that it is a promise made by one party to 
hold the other party harmless, which means financial assumption of liability.130 
Indemnification agreements come into the equation when the superintendent determines 
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that carrying a concealed weapon is not within the scope of employment and therefore the 
individual is not acting as an agent for the district, but the school allows voluntary carry 
on campus. 
To protect the district from the independent actions of others, the superintendent 
should require an indemnification agreement. The thrust of the agreement means if a 
claim or lawsuit were brought against the district associated with the firearm, the owner 
of the firearm would bear the financial burden in place of the district. The superintendent 
or district risk manager should ensure indemnification agreements contain language 
triggering the responsibility to defend the lawsuit as well as covering any settlements or 
judgments.131 This “duty to defend” language is important because the district will be 
able to tender the claim or suit directly to the owner of the firearm without expending 
financial resources to defend itself. The California application to carry a concealed 
weapon includes hold harmless language that can serve as an example for school districts 
to use in their own agreements.  
I accept and assume all responsibility and liability for, injury to, or death 
of any person, or damage to any property which may result through an act 
or omission of either the licensee or the agency that issued the license. In 
the event any claim, suit, or action is brought against the agency that 
issued the license, its chief officer or any of its employees, by reason of or 
in connection with any such act or omission, the licensee shall defend, 
indemnify, and hold harmless the agency that issued the license, its chief 
officer or any of its employees from such claim, suit, or action.132  
The superintendent should consult with the district risk manager or legal counsel 
to modify the language to meet district needs (e.g., substituting “agency that issued 
license” with “school district”). An indemnification agreement is only applicable when 
the superintendent has authorized carrying a concealed weapon outside the scope of 
employment. Such agreements would not apply, nor are appropriate, when carrying a 
weapon is part of the individual’s job duties. However, the best indemnification 
agreement in the world is useless without the means to provide financial coverage. If 
there is not sufficient insurance coverage that specifically extends to cover incidents 
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involving firearms, then the promise to indemnify the district is potentially worthless.133 
The coverage limits (dollar value of the insurance policy) backing an indemnification 
agreement should be comparable to what the school district carries for itself. If sufficient 
insurance cannot be secured (at a cost not borne by the district) to cover the 
indemnification agreement, then permission should not be given to allow firearms on 
campus. Assigning legal responsibility and financial accountability to those who 
voluntarily carry firearms on school campus can only be accomplished through effective 
indemnification arrangements. Without sufficient insurance covering the full scope of a 
MoreGuns policy and indemnification agreements where appropriate the school district is 
financially vulnerable. 
H. TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION 
The California Occupational Safety and Health Administration (Cal/OSHA) 
enforces the safety orders enacted by the California Department of Industrial 
Relations.134 The California Injury and Illness Prevention Program (IIPP) requires 
employers to train employees in hazards specific to their jobs.135 Training in firearm 
safety becomes an employer requirement when the firearm is incorporated as a potential 
job function. Failure to implement a training program not only brings potential fines from 
Cal/OSHA, but also would certainly create adverse liability in the event something goes 
wrong. In addition, although a MoreGuns ideology supports voluntary carry outside the 
scope of employment, it is still incumbent upon the school agency to ensure individuals 
who carry firearms on campus have adequate training and are properly screened/certified. 
This leads to the question of “what is adequate training and certification?” Examples 
from Nevada, Texas, and South Dakota serve as useful examples of addressing this issue. 
The Nevada regents proposed a policy that would allow any faculty or staff 
member to volunteer to be trained and armed as members of a special reserve officer 
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corps.136 The individuals would have to pass a physical and psychological examination 
and would complete classes on firearms and defensive tactics at the local Law 
Enforcement Training Academy.137 Texas is another state that has not only contemplated 
but also implemented a program of arming school district employees.138 Texas enacted a 
law in 2013 that allows schools to designate employees as “marshals” who have access to 
guns.139 A psychological exam and 80 hours of instruction are required.140 In 2013, the 
South Dakota “School Sentinels” law was enacted, allowing districts to arm 
employees.141 The law provides that teachers wishing to carry firearms on campus must 
first obtain permission from the school district and then undergo rigorous training. 
Supporters said that such a law will make schools safer by allowing teachers to become 
“first responders.”142 In the Nevada, Texas, and South Dakota examples, formalized and 
“rigorous” training is a necessary component of allowing employees to carry concealed 
weapons.143  
As with many California jurisdictions using the Department of Justice concealed 
weapon application, Kern County only requires an eight-hour class to carry a concealed 
weapon, and no psychological evaluation is necessary.144 Patrick Kilchermann, founder 
of Concealed Carry University, asserts that even seasoned officers with hundreds of 
hours of training still freeze.145 If trained police officers hit their targets only 20 to 30 
percent of the time,146 it is unwise to think less trained school employees will perform 
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any better. An eight-hour class is not enough to enable someone to be a first responder in 
a school district. If a California school district desires to adopt a MoreGuns ideology, 
comprehensive training requirements like that of Nevada, Texas, or South Dakota would 
provide a greater level of competency.  
Fortunately, California does have a robust framework for training, which can be 
used to inform policy requirements and to establish recommendations for all school 
agencies wanting to adopt a MoreGuns policy. It is found within the regulatory 
framework of the California Penal Code and the Business and Professions Code. 
Depending on the scope of the job duties and expectations, the minimum amount of 
training for individuals who are assigned school security functions is 24 hours of 
instruction. If carrying a weapon is a desired component, as would be in a MoreGuns 
ideology, then firearms training pursuant to Penal Code 832 is required. The training 
must comply with the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) and 
is 24 hours of combined instruction, firearm handling, and demonstration of proficiency. 
Table 1 Illustrates the various levels of required and recommended training applicable to 
specific roles and functions for staff carrying firearms. 
I. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 
Run, hide, fight147 is a concept that is gaining traction across the country and is 
now taught in schools as the preferred philosophy for responding to active shooter 
incidents.148 In Kern County, California, school staff are being taught this concept with 
the instruction they have the discretion to decide for themselves (and their students), 
which action is most appropriate in an active shooter situation, given their specific 
circumstance.149 Running away is the desired outcome and whenever possible should be 
the option of choice. If running is not an option, hiding or fighting become alternate 
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possibilities. Advocates for a MoreGuns ideology argue that introducing firearms within 
the “fight” context of run, hide, fight is a logical and desired option.150 Therefore, 
emergency procedures should be altered to account for the added element.151 Staff should 
know who has a firearm and how it will be deployed within the run, hide, fight context. 
Staff who are designated or authorized to respond to an active shooter scenario may have 
to leave students to respond. Emergency plans must take this into consideration and 
provide alternate procedures to ensure students are not left unattended. Even in instances 
where voluntary carry is allowed but individuals are not identified, emergency procedures 
should be explicit regarding staff expectations and responsibilities. It is not enough to 
revise written plans to accommodate the introduction of armed employees; drills and 
exercises are of critical importance to develop skill and proficiency. School responders 
may find themselves in an environment of smoke filled areas where fire alarms are 
sounding and where fire sprinklers have activated. The shooter may have even taken 
hostages or is using another student as a human shield. Such chaotic environments are 
well beyond the scope of what most employees will be capable of navigating 
successfully.  
Lastly, school authorities must work closely with first responders to identify staff 
who may be on school grounds responding with a firearm to help prevent 
misidentification and unintended casualties. Misidentification, or “friendly fire,” is a risk 
in any active shooter situations where there are multiple responders, particularly plain-
clothed individuals not in police uniforms.152 According to Dorfsman, “With adrenaline, 
stress and emotions at the forefront, such tragedies can occur.”153 Therefore, it is 
imperative that school personnel train in collaboration with local law enforcement and 
develop a communication system to reduce the risk of responder casualties. 
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J. BOARD POLICY 
A MoreGuns ideology must be supported by a written board policy and 
administrative regulation. The board policy provides the legal authority to discipline or 
terminate employees for policy violations, and makes implementation of a MoreGuns 
policy explicit. Table 1 contains training requirements and recommendations for armed 
personnel for a board to consider when developing policy.  
Essential components for an administrative regulation include the following:154 
• Who is eligible to carry firearms? 
• Whether voluntary carry is allowed 
• What types of guns and ammunition is permissible and prohibited? 
• Training and certification requirements 
• Compliance with local firearms licensing requirements 
• Requirement for mental health screening if not required by local law 
enforcement permitting agency 
• Provisions for storage 
• Conditions for authorized use 
• Emergency response requirements and procedures 
Considerations regarding authorized use go beyond active shooter scenarios. For 
instance, someone with a concealed weapons permit could legally use the weapon to 
break up a fight on campus if the shooter believed one of the participants was in grave 
danger. According to California Penal Code 197, “homicide is justifiable … when 
resisting any attempt … to do some great bodily injury upon any person.” Is this 
consistent with current district policies that outline and prescribe interventions using 
methods that do not include the use of guns? Would allowing an individual to discharge 
or brandish the weapon within the scope of their legal right conflict with the established 
protocols already in place? In many cases, the answer is yes, such actions will conflict 
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with current campus safety protocols. The conflict or divergence must be overcome and 
addressed adequately within policy.  
Table 1.   Training Requirements and Recommendations for Armed 
Personnel 
Training Requirements and Recommendations 






















School Resource Officer1 x x    
Reserve/Volunteer Officer2 x  x x x  
Commercial Security Firm3      
Without firearm     x 
With firearm    x x 
School Employee      
School Police Officer4 x x    
Reserve Police Officer5 x x x x  
Security with Firearm6    x x 
Voluntary Carry7    x x 
1. A school resource officer is a sworn member of a law enforcement agency. Firearms training is 
included as part of the POST Basic Training. All POST training is pursuant to Penal Code 832. 
2. A reserve officer may provide services to school agencies but must have completed either the 
POST Basic Training or the POST reserve officer training in combination with the POST Firearm 
training. The POST Campus Law Enforcement training is also required. 
3. California Business and Professions Code 7583.45 governs security personnel assigned to 
provide services to a K-12 or community college who are employed by a commercial security agency. 
Background checks and screening requirements are incorporated into the code section. Training is 
pursuant to the Bureau of Security and Investigative Services (BSIS) of the Department of Consumer 
Affairs. 
4. California Education Code 38000 authorizes a school district to establish a police department. 
These officers receive the same training as the school resource officers employed by a law enforcement 
agency. 
5. California Education Code 350215.5 authorizes the use of unpaid volunteer school police reserve 
officers. However, such officers are only authorized when it supplements and is administered by a school 
police department. The same training requirements apply as listed in point 2 above. 
6. Required training for personnel who work more than 20 hours a week as a security guard and are 
not sworn officers. Although the training is required at a threshold of 20 hours, this is the minimum level 
of training recommended for all personnel authorized to carry a firearm as part of their employment. 
7. Recommended training for personnel who are allowed to voluntarily carry their firearm on 
campus. 
Note: The above training requirements and recommendations are for initial certification/qualification 
to carry a firearm. Additional training for maintaining proficiency with the weapon and ongoing 
qualification requirements are recommended. The minimum recommendation for requalification (which is 
demonstration of proficiency at a test range) is every two years. 
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V. SOMEGUNS 
Step with care and great tact, and remember that Life’s a Great 
Balancing Act. 
 — Dr. Seuss 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With MoreGuns and BanGuns ideologies largely polarized, any middle ground is 
hard to imagine. Robert Birnbaum frames it as follows,  
Each group has been looking for the unrealistic 100% solution; settling for 
the 80% solution might enable both of them to achieve many of their 
objectives. Like most compromises, this one would have to have 
something for everyone and will not completely satisfy anyone. Most 
important, it will have to move past the simple MoreGuns/BanGuns 
dichotomy.155  
Perhaps a SomeGuns approach is enough of a compromise to provide both sides with a 
policy position they can support. Law enforcement intervention (either surrendered to or 
apprehended by) accounts for 31 percent of how school shootings have resolved as 
compared to 28 percent for civilian intervention;156 however, many school shooters were 
neither apprehended nor surrendered, they committed suicide. Many of the suicides 
occurred after police arrived and engaged the perpetrator with gunfire.157 In some 
instances, the police response was in the form of a school based school resource officer or 
security guard.158 Clearly, having some guns on campus can be seen as providing an 
advantage. A SomeGuns approach provides reduced risk and liability, restricts who can 
carry a firearm, and requires less arduous oversight than the MoreGuns approach. The 
SomeGuns ideology is a good compromise for agencies that have a lower tolerance for 
risk and have a lower capacity for policy administration. 
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The most vigorous opposition to the MoreGuns ideology comes from school 
administrators and staff,159 but a SomeGuns approach may address the element they most 
oppose: arming teachers. The SomeGuns approach does not include arming faculty and 
does not include voluntary carry. Under this ideology, the only individuals who are 
authorized to carry a firearm are security personnel or police officers. These restrictions 
can provide a palatable alternative to the anti-gun culture while still appeasing the culture 
whereby guns achieve/provide security. In 1999, the Department of Justice Office of 
Community Policing Services (COPS) initiated the COPS in Schools (CIS) grant 
program, which dramatically increased the use of school resource officers in schools.160 
Over $760 million has been allocated in federal grants for the hiring of over 7,500 school 
resource officers across the country.161 Although more funding is needed to expand the 
placement and utilization of school resource officers, the concept is well grounded and 
effective. 
C. COURSE AND SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT 
There are basically three types of personnel who may carry a firearm under the 
SomeGuns ideology. The district’s tolerance for risk, capacity for policy administration, 
and financial resources will determine how the personnel are selected/decided. The first 
category is a school resource officer (SRO). An SRO is an officer of a local law 
enforcement agency providing services pursuant to contract. The second category is a 
school police officer employed by the school district. It is not uncommon for large 
schools districts to have their own internal law enforcement department. Kern High 
School District has one of the largest law enforcement agencies in Kern County, 
California. Its officers receive the same training as other law enforcement agencies, plus 
additional training specific to school district environments. The third category is security 
personnel employed by a third-party security company. Like an SRO, a security officer 
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would not be an employee of the school district but provides services under contract with 
the employing agency. 
D. VOLUNTARY CARRY 
A SomeGuns ideology does not support voluntary carry for all employees; 
however, there is a place for volunteers under the scope of a law enforcement agency. 
California Education Code 35021.5 allows a school district to, “establish an unpaid 
volunteer school police reserve officer corps to supplement a police department 
established pursuant to Section 38000.” These volunteers would be considered employees 
of the school district for purposes of liability, workers’ compensation, oversight, etc. 
Limiting voluntary carry to trained personnel under the supervision of a law enforcement 
agency meets the SomeGuns cautious approach to allowing firearms on campus. In 2013, 
assembly bill (AB) 202 was introduced into the California Legislature; it would have 
established the School Marshall Plan. The bill was a poor attempt at a SomeGuns 
ideology, lacking direction or detail for implementation and leaving training requirements 
up to the jurisdiction issuing concealed weapon licenses (in most California jurisdictions 
as little as eight hours of training). On the other hand, Texas has an excellent school 
marshal program, and other states wishing to explore such programs can learn from its 
structure and regulatory framework.  
E. LEGAL LIABILITY 
The use of contracted SROs and security firms reduces liability for a school 
district but does not eliminate it. Employment liability is clearly reduced or eliminated, 
but contractual liability is added. On January 10, 2013, the Taft Union High School 
District experienced an active shooter situation. The shooter, Bryan Oliver, targeted and 
shot Bowe Cleveland. Cleveland survived his injuries and subsequently filed a civil suit 
against the school district. The school district employed a Taft Police Department officer 
as a SRO under contract at the time of the shooting. Unfortunately, an unusual storm 
event prevented the SRO from reporting to school that day. After the school district 
received a tort claim and civil suit from Cleveland, it filed a complaint against the City of 
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Taft for breach of contract.162 The school district alleges that had the officer reported for 
duty, Oliver would have been deterred or detected and therefore the shooting would not 
have occurred. The school district claims because the officer did not report for duty, Taft 
Police Department is therefore liable for the shooting. In its Notice of Demurrer, the City 
of Taft claims it has immunity under Government Code 820.2 and 815.2(b) and “is not 
liable for an alleged failure to exercise its police authority.” Furthermore, the city claims 
it is immune: 
Except as provided otherwise by statute, a public employee is not liable 
for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission 
was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or 
not such discretion be abused. Since the public employee is immune, the 
public entity employing the employee is also immune.163  
The court overruled the city’s demurrer leaving whether or not the Taft Police 
Department has liability in question.164 However, this suit raises the specter of 
adversarial relationships in SRO agreements between school districts and law 
enforcement agencies. Will this suit squelch or constrain SRO agreements in general? 
That remains to be seen. As of January 15, 2016, the lawsuit was still pending. 
F. GUN LAWS 
The nuances of California gun laws are less burdensome to navigate in a 
SomeGuns policy application. Restricting firearms to law enforcement or security 
personnel allows a school district to benefit from the exemptions pertaining to open carry, 
concealed carry, and carrying on school property. Weapons storage must still preclude 
access by minors,165 and the 2015 amendments to the GFSZA still allows individuals to 
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have a firearm and ammunition on school grounds if they are contained in the locked 
trunk of a vehicle.166  
G. INSURANCE AND INDEMNITY 
Insurance and indemnity is less of an issue when those who carry firearms are 
limited and restricted as with the SomeGuns approach. However, it is still imperative that 
school administrators complete a coverage analysis to ensure adequate coverage is in 
place. As with the MoreGuns approach, consultation with the district’s risk manager, and 
insurance coverage attorney if necessary, is recommended to determine the presence, 
absence, or limitation of coverage. Key items to note include the following: who is an 
insured, definition of occurrence (accident or event-based), definition of wrongful act and 
any exclusion that may apply (use of firearm, injuries that were expected or intended, 
etc.). A thorough coverage analysis, which compares the anticipated actions and 
outcomes of school district employees against policy language, and understanding how 
the claims administrator will interpret the policy language in the event a claim both help 
shape policy. 
As demonstrated with the lawsuit filed against the Taft Police Department, 
insurance and indemnity are important elements when dealing with outside agencies. This 
applies whether SROs are employed by the local law enforcement agency or with 
security personnel contracted through a commercial firm. Scope of coverage and 
adequate limits are unlikely to be issues for a law enforcement agency. However, policies 
with commercial agencies bear scrutiny to ensure adequate coverage and policy limits are 
acceptable. Minimum acceptable limits should be specified in all contracts (law 
enforcement and commercial security) and indemnification language should also be 
included. The city of Taft’s demurrer states the school district complaint failed to specify 
the existence of a contract and the explicit performance requirements and its resulting 
nonperformance.167 This is a compelling argument that serves as a reminder: achieving 
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indemnification from third parties rests in the detail and precision of the contract 
language. 
H. TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION 
As with a MoreGuns approach, the category of personnel in a SomeGuns 
approach dictates the level of training and certification required. As illustrated in Table 1, 
depending on the category, a minimum of 48 hours of training is required or 
recommended in order to carry a firearm. However, some districts are looking at 
alternative training with the intent of raising awareness, not arming employees. The Galt 
Joint Union Elementary School District is exploring such an alternative. It is not training 
employees to be first responders but are offering training to staff that desire to learn more 
about handling a gun. The three-hour training is aimed at familiarizing school staff with 
guns so that they would be prepared to safely pick up a dropped weapon, tell whether it is 
cocked or loaded, and describe types of weapons to first responders in the event of an 
active shooter scenario.168 The district believes this type of innovative solution could 
increase safety without compromising district policies prohibiting concealed weapons. Of 
Galt’s 500 employees, 139 signed up for the training, which is taught by the local police 
department.169 
I. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 
A SomeGuns ideology is easier to assimilate into emergency response plans than 
a MoreGuns approach. Limiting firearms to security or law enforcement personnel helps 
ensure that instructors stay with their students. For districts that have adopted the run, 
hide, fight philosophy, the fight element that involves firearms is left to individuals who 
have had sufficient training and who do not have to leave students unattended. However, 
it is still important that emergency response plans acknowledge armed responders may be 
present and outline the procedures for response. Where contract employees are utilized, 
the contract should specify expectations for emergency response in an active shooter 
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scenario. As with the MoreGuns approach, coordinating the emergency plan with local 
law enforcement first responders is necessary to identify staff that may be responding 
with a firearm to help prevent misidentification and unintended casualties. 
J. BOARD POLICY 
The elements of a board policy under the SomeGuns approach articulate the 
district’s policy regarding the restrictions for employees carrying firearms. Because only 
law enforcement or security officers are authorized to carry firearms, the policy in a 
SomeGuns approach will be similar to the policy under the BanGuns ideology. Because 
internal personnel are either police or security, operational policies and procedures are 
more likely addressed within departmental standard operating procedures and manuals 








Knowledge of what is does not open the door directly to what should be.  
— Albert Einstein 
 
Although this research strives to highlight the essential elements in deciding 
whether to arm school employees or add armed personnel to a school campus, the overall 
issue is bigger than the scope contained here. One area in particular that could benefit 
from future research and consideration is the option of armed volunteers who are not 
employees of the school district but are under the jurisdiction of local law enforcement. 
This option has been successfully implemented in Israel in the form of its Civil Guard. 
The Civil Guard is comprised of police volunteers/community watch personnel who work 
under the Israeli police.170 They are trained and qualified to carry firearms.171 The 
United States saw what could have been the genesis of a civil guard in the aftermath of 
the Newtown shooting, when Sergeant (Sgt.) Craig Pusley, a marine veteran of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, took up a self-imposed duty in front of the Hughson Elementary School.172 
Harnessing the power of well-trained and committed volunteers can provide school safety 
without draining resources—Israel has demonstrated this is indeed the case. 
The outcome of this research does not result in advocating for a particular policy 
option but instead advocates for a policy process. The process weighs existing paradigms, 
challenges them, and seeks to neutralize them in favor of a policy outcome most 
appropriate for a particular school district.173 In this way, an agreed path, with agreed 
goals, feedback, and expectations, can be achieved. In her book, Thinking in Systems, 
author Donella Meadows notes, “when policymakers can detach from their paradigms, 
stay flexible, and realize that no paradigm is ‘true,’ then progress in changing a system 
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can be achieved.”174 The use of risk management principles introduces objective decision 
making were the process drives the outcome and the ideology rather than the other way 
around. Following this approach helps keep potential policy-blocking paradigms at bay 
because objectivity is introduced, achieving the detachment. Meadows advocates, “If no 
paradigm is right, you can choose whatever one will help to achieve your purpose.”175  
Although the issue of whether or not to arm school employees can seem urgent, 
particularly with a recent event in the backdrop spurring policymakers to action, a calm 
and deliberate approach is necessary to make good policy. A superintendent who can lead 
a calm and deliverable approach may provide the opportunity “to look more closely at the 
feedback within the system, to understand the bounded rationality behind them, and to 
find a way to meet the goals of the participants in the system while moving policymaking 
in a better direction.”176 The following policy options discussed in this research represent 
the various paradigms that exist or can exist to create policy. They include: MoreGuns 
(allow teachers to be armed), BanGuns (no one is armed), or SomeGuns (trained security 
or law enforcement can be armed but not teachers). Acknowledging Meadows assertion 
that no paradigm is “true,” none of these policy options is truer than the next, but instead 
are all true and it is the mission of the superintendent in partnership with the applicable 
stakeholders to determine which option is most true for them.  
Application of the risk management decision-making process provides a 
foundation for objective policy-making whether the issue is arming school employees or 
not. While an active shooter is the current black swan considered by most school districts, 
the stabbing attack at UC Merced proposes that the next black swan may not be related to 
guns at all.177 Regardless, school administrators who become accustomed to using a risk 
management driven approach will have policies founded on a solid assessment of risk, 
capability, and culture. Therefore, a successful policy approach considers the whole 
system of interconnected pieces and understands how one decision or action affects other 
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parts. Meadows reminds us that we are not omniscient. Rather, “we are rational 
optimizers, blundering ‘satisficers,’ attempting to satisfy our needs well enough to move 
onto the next decision.”178 She says:  
We do our best to further our own nearby interests in a rational way, but 
we can take into account only what we know. We don’t know what others 
are planning to do, until they do it. We rarely see the full range of 
possibilities before us. We often don’t foresee (or choose to ignore) the 
impacts of our action on the whole system. So instead of finding a long-
term optimum, we discover within our limited purview a choice we can 
live with for now, and we stick to it, changing our behavior only when 
forced to.179  
Using risk management principles as the backdrop and foundation for making policy 
provides the best opportunity for success moving forward by prompting policymakers to 
overcome these tendencies to move from simply being a satisficer to being a sound 
policymaker. 
Legislators across the nation, including California, continue to promote programs 
encouraging the presence of armed school employees, and they seem to be doing so en 
masse. The California School Marshal Plan has seven authors,180 and a Texas bill in 2009 
has 70.181 More school gun bills are pending in the current legislative session,182 which 
indicates elected officials think arming school employees is something for consideration. 
Sooner or later school superintendents and governing boards will be forced into 
considering whether arming employees, allowing voluntary concealed carry, or gun 
prohibitions are the right decision for their districts. Therefore, this research has sought to 
provide an objective, relevant decision-making process in a cohesive framework. 
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APPENDIX A. RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX FOR GUN POLICY 
IN K-12 SCHOOLS 
The following risk assessment matrix illustrates how key decision points move 
from conditions warranting risk avoidance or areas of higher risk, indicating where policy 
or protocols need to be adjusted, to conditions supporting policy and acceptable levels of 
risk. The risk assessment matrix is intended to assess risk according to individual criteria 








Conditions Supporting Policy 
Elevated Risk  
Conditions Warranting Caution or 
Further Risk Mitigation 
Uncontrolled/Unmanaged Risk 
Conditions Warranting Risk 
Avoidance 
Social/Cultural 
Parent and employee groups support a 
culture of guns on campus. No 
opposition expressed toward arming staff 
or security personnel. 
Parent groups support a policy of arming 
employees, but employee groups are 
resistant or opposed. Consider only 
arming administrators to avoid conflict 
with employee groups or hire security 
personnel. 
Parent groups and employee groups do 
not support guns on campus. 
Course and Scope 
of Employment 
Use of firearm has been identified as 
desired and required part of job duties.  
Use of firearm is desired but not 
required.  
Use of firearms is not a required or 
desired element of job duties. 
Voluntary Carry 
Job duties do not require use of a 
weapon, but culture supports voluntary 
carry for employees who have a 
concealed weapons permit, proof of 
insurance, and hold harmless agreement. 
Local permit authority collaborates with 
school district on permit requirements. 
Job duties do not require use of a 
firearm, but culture supports voluntary 
carry. Insurance is minimal. Local permit 
authority collaborates with school district 
on permit requirements. 
Job duties do not require use of a 
firearm, and culture does not support 
voluntary carry. Insurance and hold 
harmless not executed. Local permit 
authority does not collaborate with 
school district on permit requirements. 
Employment/Legal 
Liability 
District is willing to incur liability for the 
presence of firearms on campus. No 
collective bargaining issues are present 
with respect to selection of employees 
designated or allowed to carry guns. 
District is willing to incur liability for the 
presence of firearms on campus. No 
collective bargaining issues are present 
with respect to selection of employees 
designated or allowed to carry guns. 
District is not willing to incur liability for 




Conditions Supporting Policy 
Elevated Risk  
Conditions Warranting Caution or 
Further Risk Mitigation 
Uncontrolled/Unmanaged Risk 
Conditions Warranting Risk 
Avoidance 
There are written procedures regulating 
storage, type of weapons approved, 
ammunition, and permissive/approved 
use of firearms. 
There are no written procedures 
regulating storage, type of weapons 
approved, ammunition, and permissive/
approved use of firearms. 
Gun Laws 
School district administration 
collaborates with local permit authority 
regarding the policies and presence of 
guns on campus. School officials have a 
clear understanding of local and state gun 
laws and all school policies are 
consistent with such laws.  
 
School authorities do not have a 
thorough understanding of gun law, but 
collaborates closely with local law 
enforcement. Local law enforcement 
policy/regulations regarding concealed 
carry are vague or unknown. 
School authorities do not collaborate 
with local permit authority, or have a 
clear understanding of state and local gun 
law. Local law enforcement is vague or 
not clearly articulated as a basis for 
school policy.  
Insurance 
Insurance can be obtained or is in place 
covering the use and presence of firearms 
on campus at limits equal to the district’s 
general liability limits. 
Insurance is not in place, but can be 
obtained covering the use and presence 
of firearms on campus at an amount less 
than the district’s general liability limits. 
Insurance cannot be obtained for use or 
presence of firearms, or limits are 
substantially less than the district’s 
general liability limits. 
Training and 
Certification 
Training consistent with Peace Officer 
Standards and Training (POST), or the 
Bureau of Security and Investigative 
Service (BSIS). A psychological 
examination is required for those who 
seek approval to carry. 
Training consistent with POST is 
required for sworn officers, but BSIS is 
not required for others. A psychological 
examination is not required. 
Training less than POST or BSIS and 




Conditions Supporting Policy 
Elevated Risk  
Conditions Warranting Caution or 
Further Risk Mitigation 
Uncontrolled/Unmanaged Risk 




Written procedures detail the 
expectations and response of those 
individuals who carry firearms and the 
conditions under which use is warranted. 
Procedures account for those who carry 
voluntarily and those who carry within 
the course of employment. Expectations 
are clearly understood and 
communicated to local law enforcement 
with regard to the presence of firearms 
on campus. 
Written procedures detail the 
expectations and response of those 
individuals who carry firearms and the 
conditions under which use is warranted. 
Expectations are clearly understood and 
communicated to local law enforcement 
as to the presence of firearms on campus. 
Procedures do not include protocols for 
those who carry voluntarily. 
There are no written procedures detailing 
the expectations and response of those 
who carry firearms on campus. 
Board Policy 
Board policy is clear and consistent 
regarding guns on campus regardless of 
whether the policy is BanGuns, 
MoreGuns, or SomeGuns. If guns are 
approved, there is a detailed 
administrative regulation, which outlines 
the provisions of approved carry 
(including all the elements above). 
Board policy is vague, and there is no 
administrative regulation, or it does not 
address all elements of the district’s gun 
policy, including elements related to 
employee discipline for policy violations. 
There is no board policy or 
administrative regulation regarding the 
presence or use of guns by employees. 
     
 
65 
APPENDIX B. DECISION FRAMEWORK FOR DETERMINING 
CONCEALED WEAPONS POLICY IN CALIFORNIA K-12 
SCHOOLS 
The decision framework illustrates the decision-making process as a decision tree. 
It is intended to help policymakers assess a firearms policy collectively, requiring 
affirmative responses prior to moving forward with policy. The decision framework will 
be most useful to those who desire a more conservative approach to ensure risk is 
adequately managed or mitigated prior to enacting policy to validate the need to avoid 
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